

Project Veraison

[pronounced “verr-ayy-sjon”]

Attestation Verification Components

About Me



Yogesh Deshpande

Principal Engineer
Arm

Security Architect in Architecture and Technology Group

Yogesh.Deshpande@arm.com

<https://www.linkedin.com/in/yogesh-deshpande-1454b71/>

Main Areas


- Attestation Standards in IETF and TCG
- Core contributor to Project “Veraison”
- Involved in Supply Chain Security

Agenda

- Introduction
- Need for Veraison
- Veraison Architecture
- Libraries and tooling provided by the Veraison Project

What is Attestation?

- A means to establishing the trustworthiness of an entity
- Produces a signed evidence about an entity
- Attestation report alone is insufficient
 - Must be verified by a trusted service
 - Verification is at the centre of any attestation flow



The Need for Veraison

Building an Attestation Verification Service


Challenges:

- Due to specific needs of deployments, it is difficult for a single offering to serve all use cases
 - required business relationships
 - regulation / compliance / geo-specifics
- If Verifiers have to be custom, then
 - standardisation and quality levels suffer between deployments
 - the cost of building a trustworthy infrastructure becomes a notable barrier to entry

Building an Attestation Verification Service

Solution:

Make common components available which make building Verification Services more straightforward!




<https://github.com/veraison/>




RATS Architecture Model

RATS → Remote **AT**testation procedures (RFC 9334)




Supply Chain & Lifecycle


(somewhat idealized)




Information Flow for Verification



Information Flow for Verification (Enterprise)



Attester and Result Heterogeneity



Project Veraison

- **VERificAtion of attestation**
- Open Source (Apache v2.0) & Open Governance
- Collection of libraries and tools for implementing a remote attestation verification service
- A Confidential Computing Consortium project
- Industry wide scope

Design Principles


- Multi architecture
- Model supply chain interaction with Verifier
- Flexible deployment models
 - Public, private, hybrid, multi cloud service
 - Single or multiple tenants
 - Potential to deploy `locally` e.g. in adjacent isolation such as Trust Zone
- Industry standards used where possible
 - IETF RATS Architecture & Information model
 - TCG DICE Endorsement data format working group

Design Overview

- API Driven
- Support for verification of multiple attestation formats
- Token Verification is flexible
 - Policy driven or extensible via plugins
- Access to Provisioned Reference Values (Endorsements)
- Reference implementations: EAT – PSA Token, Arm CCA, DICE, TPM

Veraison Architecture

Architecture Overview



Provisioning


- Authorised supply chain actors (SoC Vendors, OEM, ISVs etc) need to supply Reference Values & Endorsements to the Verifier
- Veraison uses standards driven Information Model and Data Model to convey Reference Values and Endorsements. This enables:
 - Standard Tooling
 - Reduce Fragmentation
 - Lower barrier to entry for supply chain actors

CoRIM


Concise Reference Integrity Manifest

- A signed, **CBOR**-formatted document (**COSE**)
- Data is represented as statements (*i.e. subject-verb-object “triples”*)
component “X” – has reference values – [list of values]
- CoRIM has CoMIDs and CoSWIDs that carry RV and EV from Supply Chain
- Also contains metadata (provisioner identity, versioning etc.)
- Veraison CoRIM is an implementation of CoRIM standards being developed in IETF RATS and TCG working groups
 - <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rats-corim/>
 - [TCG Endorsement Architecture](#)

Provisioning Pipeline



Provisioning




CoRIM Template Excerpt

```
"entities": [{
  "name": "ACME Corp.",
  "regid": "https://acme.com",
  "roles": [ "tagCreator", "creator", "maintainer" ]
}],
"triples": {
  "reference-values": [
    {
      "environment": { "instance": { "type": "uuid", "value": "7d<...>f1" } } },
  "measurements": [
    { "value": { "digests": [ "sha-256:h0KPxS<...>MTPJcc=" ] } }
  ]
}
}
```


Verification

- A session is established with an agreed upon **nonce**
- Attester/Relying Party submits Evidence to the Verification service
- Gets signed **Attestation Results** as an EAR document
- <https://github.com/veraison/docs/blob/main/api/challenge-response/README.md>

Verification Pipeline




Verification



Attestation Results

- IETF Standard AR4SI defines a Trustworthiness Vector
- A format to represent attestation results in a normalized way, e.g.



configuration	2			
executables	3			
file-system				0
hardware	2			
instance-identity	2			
runtime-opaque		32		
sourced-data				0
storage-opaque				0

AR4SI → Attestation Results for Secure Interaction
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rats-ar4si/>

EAR

EAT (Entity Attestation Token) Attestation Results

- A signed JSON Document (JWT) containing:
 - An overall status and an AR4SI Trust Vector
 - Annotated Evidence
 - Policy Claims
 - Time of appraisal
 - Identity of the Verifier
- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fv-rats-ear/>

EAR Example

```
{
  "ear.status": "affirming",
  "ear.trustworthiness-vector": {
    "configuration": 0,
    "executables": 2,
    [ ... ]
  },
  "ear.veraison.annotated-evidence": {
    "firmware-version": 7,
    "pcr-selection": [1, 2, 3, 4],
    "pcr-digest": "h0KPxSKAPTEGXnv0PPA/5HUJZjH14Hu9eg/eYMTPJcc=", [ ... ]
  }
}
```

Attestation Scheme

- Defines:
 - Evidence token structure
 - What Reference Values, Endorsements, and Trust Anchors are expected
 - How the Evidence is appraised
- Implemented via pluggable interfaces
- May be augmented via deployment-specific policies

Policies

- Allow “post-processing” of attestation results generated by scheme
 - Override Appraisal Decisions
 - Insert additional claims
- Implemented using **Open Policy Agent (OPA)** engine
- Written in **Rego** language
- Policies are handled via Management Interface

Policy Example

```
# This sets executables trust vector value to AFFIRMING iff BL version is # 3.5 or greater, and to failure otherwise.
```

```
executables = "AFFIRMING" {
```

```
# there exists some `i`, such that...
```

```
some i
```

```
# ...the i'th software component has type "BL", and...
```

```
evidence["psa-software-components"][i]["measurement-type"] == "BL"
```

```
# ... the version of this software component is greater than or equal to 3.5
```

```
# (semver_cmp is defined by the policy package. It returns 1 if the first parameter is
```

```
# greater than the second, -1 if it is less than the second and 0 if they are equal
```


```
semver_cmp(evidence["psa-software-components"][i].version, "3.5") >= 0
```

```
} else = "CONTRAINEDICATED" # unless the above condition is met return "CONTRAINEDICATED"
```

Libraries and Tooling

Tooling for the Supply Chain

[veraison/corim/cocli]



Other Tools

Tool	Purpose
evcli	A handy tool to manipulate Evidence to/from CBOR using JSON Claims and a crypto key Also allows exchanging Evidence with Veraison (acting as Attester or Relying Party)
arc	A CLI tool to manipulate Attestation Results
pocli	A CLI tool to manage Policies, i. e. Create, Activate, Deactivate & list Policies for a scheme
gen-corim	A handy CLI tool to generate CoRIM Endorsements from Evidence token

Current Status

- REST APIs for Access to Services
- Support for Multiple Attestation technologies
 - Implemented : PSA , CCA, TPM, DICE { OpenDICE, TCG DICE }
 - Work In Progress (AMD-SEV-SNP)
- Multi-tenancy roles and Authorization support
- Container deployment
- First implementation of standards : CoRIM/EAT Claims + Attestation Results
- Support for CoRIM Extensions – for multiple schemes { TDX, AMD-SEV-SNP }
- Deployable appraisal policy
- PoC Deployment `in TEE` with proofs

On the Roadmap

- Options to deploy without (external) plugin framework to reduce TCB
- Support for further Attestation Architectures – e.g. Intel TDX
- Inline Endorsements
- Support for Event Logs
- Exploring constrained deployment in local TEE


Out of Scope

- It is not intended to look at other aspects of verification e.g.
 - Unification of Attestation Token formats
 - Normalising how a Relying Party requests Attestation
 - Common Attestation protocol

Get Involved!

- We would be very interested in collaboration from this skilled and knowledgeable community
 - Principles/Assumptions
 - Design Aspects
 - Extend Veraison to support a new scheme to match the use case
 - Consumption/Reference deployments
- Join us on Zulip at <https://veraison.zulipchat.com/>
- Welcome to discuss @ Weekly Community Meet
 - Every Tuesday 4PM UK time

VERAISON



<https://github.com/veraison/>